Undercover Audio And though this half-hour recording of poor quality audio ( Fast forward to 2 minute mark)is difficult to follow, listen carefully as a man and a woman appeared at a federal narcotics enforcement office in an ordinary commercial building at No. 6801 Sanger Ave., Waco, and negotiated their way to a better deal than the courts and prosecutors had offered.
Insane Throttle Disclaimer– Legendary Jim is a Freelance Writer who contributes articles and news stories to Insane Throttle Biker News. Insane Throttle does not take a position either way on material contributed by Freelance Writers. But in an effort to be open and honest, keeping with our policy of always getting both sides of the story out, we do not censor any reports coming in. We will ALWAYS give the other side a chance to respond if they choose to do so
STATUS QUO, SIR? WHY, THAT’S LATIN FOR THE MESS WE’VE DONE GOT OURSELVES INTO NOW…Court Testimony of a Texas Ranger
Waco – One can only pray that they died in a state of grace.
IS THERE ANY SUCH THING AS QUID PRO QUO IN ETERNITY?
Further, one can only hope the conflagration following the intense explosion that melted the aluminum walls of the trailer was more merciful than the prospect of a life to be lived in these circumstances.
In this world, it matters a lot when you stop and listen to the players come and go from the rooms, their voices recorded in a medium of iron oxide particles magnetized and aligned in sonic patterns on a moving tape, or recorded in a digital medium under layers of spinning polymer on a disk or spinning hard drive.
The dreidel moves on, the players trade with authorities striving to influence the actions of grand jurors, magistrates, agents and judges, their actions spinning into an infinity of inertia, enshrouded in a mystery wrapped in the well-known terms of unexplained enigma.
Somewhere, at the bottom of the heap of ruin, in a time so well forgotten by a future unfolding now, the words taken down surreptitiously on an audio recorder in a woman’s back jeans pocket on August 9, 2012, in a sub-office of a federal narcotics task force manned by DEA agents matter-of-factly inquiring as to who has what dog in the fight, and what are they willing to trade for what they want, a pattern emerges.
It’s a sordid tale of sorrow, a recurring theme of which is terror, stark fear backed up by a constant threat of violent retribution for what can only be described as an insanely shifting litany of abuses in which snitches wind up in ditches, or get stitches – or something just as fearsome.
Men who have sacrificed their freedom and live behind bars for life call the shots, pick and choose who will die by fire, by the knife or the gun. They pride themselves on their Aryan origins, their steely resolve to be a kingpin player in a world in which the only rule is that there are no rules, where the inmates rule the asylum, the authorities are there to preserve the record and the judges only are able to make decisions on the interpretation of the law, its application to the facts found, and the proof is in the shifting sands of a learned judicial establishment.
When it is expedient, public officials resign, retire under duress, or accept other positions of less authority. One such person is former arson investigator Kevin Fisk of the Waco Fire Marshal’s office, who now works as a court-appointed private investigator on the first of the Twin Peaks cases to come to trial, that of Bandido Jake Carrizal. His story is of interest because of the sheer wall of silence that surrounds the illegal dealings of public officials involved in the investigation of the deaths of Ashley Dawn Rogers and two of her little kids. Rather than succumb to claims that his mind has been adversely affected, he accepted an early retirement and career changing lateral move to the private sector.
The record is made murky by bureaucratic maneuvers and rulings, but Fisk clears it up this way: “You always seem to leave the impression I left to avoid having to fight accusation of me sustaining mental defect. I did not even file my lawsuit until AFTER I had been ruled fully fit for duty, and had proven the city’s accusations wrong…
“I retired purely because of constructive discharge. ‘Either you can retire today, or go back to work until we find a reason to fire you, at which point you won’t be entitled to your cash-out pay and retirement.’”
And then the men who manipulate the system from their citadels inside prison walls mark themselves with indelible ink tattoos on their faces.
Mother of God, be with us now and at the time of our deaths…
IT’S VERY TRUE, THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT COMPEL ONE TO PRAY, BUT IT SURE AS HELL CAN CREATE CONDITIONS THAT WILL PERSUADE ONE TO AT LEAST GIVE IT A TRY… – LEGENDARY JIM
On a cold February night in 2012, an explosion of unknown origin from a mysterious source of sudden heat took the lives of a mother and two of her small children in a Bosqueville trailer park near the Brazos river banks.
The resulting drama led to the loss of jobs for the Chief of Waco Police, the Chief of the Fire Department, a number of detectives, and the sacrifice of truth in pursuit of justice.
Seven defendants indicted for engaging in organized criminal activity walked free of their fetters, some on them to return to prisons for unspecified crimes against the state committed in other places, other times. (click here)
And though this half-hour recording of poor quality audio is difficult to follow, listen carefully as a man and a woman appeared at a federal narcotics enforcement office in an ordinary commercial building at No. 6801 Sanger Ave., Waco, and negotiated their way to a better deal than the courts and prosecutors had offered.
It’s as cut and dried as a contract deal, a price for constructing a building, or the terms of a labor resolution to some obscure dispute.
It’s simply the way things are done, but its deadly parallels with the mess we done got ourselves in now stand out in stark relief, bold contrast to what is ideal and what is expected of our blindfolded goddess of justice, Themis.
Put in stereo ear buds and behold: Josh Gunter had been busted for trafficking in a controlled substance. His companion went to Kingsville and got him, transported him to the narc office and stood by while he bargained away – and all the while, the local authorities balked at just simply arresting the people implicated in a heinous murder by fire, fire allegedly used as a weapon, an act of capital murder, punishable by death if jurors suspect the actor is capable of repeating his actions on his fellow human beings if allowed to live inside a prison for the rest of his life.
David Franklin Stone is Zeke, National President Cossacks The Following is apart of public record
DAVID FRANKLIN STONE v. STATE TEXAS (04/28/83)
 COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, TWELFTH DISTRICT, TYLER
 No. 12-81-0144-CR
 1983.TX.40763 <http://www.versuslaw.com>; 658 S.W.2d 648
 April 28, 1983
 DAVID FRANKLIN STONE, APPELLANT v.
STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
 Appeal from the 7th Judicial District Court of Smith County, Texas.
 Weldon Holcomb, Tyler, Tex. for appellant.
 Charles F. Montgomery, Jr., Asst. D.A., Jack Skeen, Jr., D.A., Tyler, Tex. for appellee.
 Colley, J.
 Author: Colley
 PAUL S. COLLEY, Associate Justice
 Appellant was convicted of murder by a jury on his not guilty plea. The jury assessed punishment at nineth-nine years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections.
 Appellant was first tried and convicted of the same offense by a jury in January 1979.That jury assessed his punishment at forty years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction for error committed by the trial court in admitting into evidence incriminating statements made by appellant as result of a custodial interrogation in violation of appellant’s Miranda rights. Stone v. State, 612 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Cr. App. 1981).
 No challenge is made by the appellant as to the
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sufficiency of the evidence.
 In this appeal appellant raises two grounds of error: (1) the error of the trial court “… in failing to instruct the jury on the law of accomplice [testimony] as raised by the evidence in this cause”; and (2) the error of the trial court “… in failing to reduce the sentence received by defendant at second trial to the [judgment] received at first trial which was reversed on constitutional grounds.”
 Appellant’s argument under his first ground is that the State’s witnesses, Sandra McIntyre, Denny Carlson and Richard Swann, were accomplice witnesses as a matter of law, or at least the evidence raises a question of fact as to whether each was an accomplice witness and that the question should have been submitted to the jury. In passing on this ground it is necessary to briefly discuss the evidence to determine if it connects any one of such witnesses as a party to the commission of the offense for which the appellant was tried and convicted herein.
 The record reflects that Vicky Lynn Gill was brutally murdered on July 7, 1977. During that day she had visited briefly with her father and brother showing to each of them a certificate of title she had received for a motorcycle she had built herself. At approximately 5:00 p.m. on July 7, 1977, the State’s witness, Virginia Jeraldine Brown, observed a two-toned Cadillac automobile parked next to a motorcycle, and a young man and woman walking towards the woods near the location where Vicky Gill’s body was later found. Brown described the woman as having shoulder-length blond hair and dressed in jeans. She described the man as large and tall. Other testimony in the case established that these descriptions matched the physical characteristics of appellant and the victim. She testified also that she saw the same Cadillac again in the yard of the home of appellant’s parents. The evidence reveals that appellant owned such a vehicle. The victim’s body was located and recovered by the Smith County Sheriff’s Department on July 7, 1977, acting on information given the officers by the appellant and his attorney on the same date.
 Sandra McIntyre’s (hereafter McIntyre) testimony reveals that she was an acquaintance of appellant, and that her husband Joe was a friend and acquaintance of the appellant and also
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a fellow member of a motorcycle club called the “Cossacks.” McIntyre also knew the murder victim. On July 8, 1977, appellant visited with McIntrye and her husband at their home in Tyler, Texas. McIntrye overheard a conversation between her husband and appellant where, when her husband told appellant, “but you are only eighteen years old and you have beat a girl to death,” appellant replied, “I shouldn’t have killed her but…” McIntyre also testified that when she asked appellant whether or not he “… thought he would do something like that again,” appellant replied, “he didn’t know.” The record clearly demonstrates that McIntrye was not connected with the commission of the murder in any way, either before, during or after the commission of the offense.
 Denny Carlson (hereafter Carlson) was also a member of the Cossacks and he was a friend of appellant as well. On July 8, 1977, Carlson was also visiting at the McIntyre home in Tyler where the McIntyres were barbecuing meats on a grill in the backyard of their home. Carlson testified he observed the appellant burning some papers in the barbecue grill among which, the witness observed, was a certificate of title for a motorcycle, and at trial Carlson testified in part as follows:
 Q All right. Is that the same title that you see [sic] David Franklin Stone start to burn out there on that date?
 A Yes, Sir.
 Q Now, when he was burning these papers, did he make any statement to you as to whether or not, or why he was burning them or anything?
 A Not at the time, sir.
 Q Did he later?
 A Yes, sir.
 Q What did he say?
 A He said he didn’t want to have them on him.
 Q I’m sorry?
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 A Did not want to have it on him.
 Q He didn’t want to have them on him?
 A Yes, sir.
 Q All right. Did he give you that title, that piece of paper right there?
 A Yes, sir.
 Q Let me shift a little bit, Mr. Carlson, and let me ask you if, within the last, let’s say within the last couple of weeks, maybe three weeks, have you seen David Franklin Stone during that period of time?
 A Yes, sir.
 Q Where did you see him?
 A At the Harley-Davidson Shop.
 Q I’m sorry, where?
 A At the Harley-Davidson shop.
 Q At the Harley-Davidson shop?
 A Yes, sir.
 Q Is that a motorcycle shop?
 A Yes, sir.
 Q Did he talk to you or make any statement to you that his trial was fixing to come up?
 A Yes.
 Q And did he say anything to you in reference to what you ought to do in reference to his trial fixing to come up?
 A Yes.
 Q What did he say?
 A He said, lay low.
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 Q To lay low?
 A Yes, sir.
 The record reflects that Carlson, after recovering the title, forged the victim’s name thereto, ostensibly transferring the title to the motorcycle to himself. Carlson readily admitted the forgery, but denied on cross-examination that the State had given him immunity for his testimony in the case.
 Richard Swann (hereafter Swann) was also a friend and acquaintance of appellant at the time of the offense and a member of the Cossacks motorcycle club. Swann testified that on the evening of July 7, 1977, appellant called him on the telephone asking for help. Appellant asked the witness Swann to bring a shovel and meet him at an Exxon station on the Van Highway in Smith County. Swann met the appellant but failed to secure a shovel as requested. Swann testified that the appellant was very upset and agitated when he saw him on that night and said to him, “… she’s dead, she’s dead…” and directed Swann in driving to the location where the body of the victim was later found. Swann got out of his vehicle in which he and appellant were traveling after the appellant had advised him where to stop on the highway and went in search of and found the body of the murder victim. Swann testified he felt for a pulse on the body and found none. Swann returned to his vehicle and drove appellant ultimately to a lawyer’s office (Weldon Holcomb) who subsequently accepted employment as appellant’s counsel, and who now represents appellant in this appeal. The record shows that Swann gave the same testimony before the grand jury as he gave at the trial of the case.
 No evidence produced at trial even suggests that McIntyre, Carlson or Swann participated in any way in the murder of Vicky Lynn Gill within the purview of Section 7.02, V.T.C.A., Penal Code.*fn1 The claim of appellant that McIntyre is an accomplice witness is, in our opinion, entirely frivolous. While Carlson might have been prosecuted for forging the motorcycle title, or for concealing evidence under Section 38.09 of the Penal Code, the facts show, as a matter of law, that he could not have been charged with the murder of Vicky Lynn Gill as a party under the provisions of Section 7.01 et seq. of the Penal
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Code. Thompson v. State, 501 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973); Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Cr. App. 1976). There is no evidence showing, or tending to show, Swann’s complicity with the crime under the same provisions of the Penal Code above quoted. Easter v. State, supra.
 It should be noted here that none of the persons claimed by appellant to be accomplice witnesses were charged with the offense for which appellant was on trial, and that the facts concerning the relationship of each alleged accomplice witness with the appellant and the offense were undisputed. Based upon our careful examination of the record we conclude as a matter of law that McIntyre, Carlson and Swann are not accomplice witnesses. Appellant’s first ground is overruled. See Silba v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 135, 275 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Cr. App. 1954).
 In his second ground, appellant argues that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), requires reversal here because the jury in appellant’s second trial assessed a harsher punishment against appellant (ninety-nine years) than he received in his first trial (forty years). As appellant points out, the jury was informed in the second trial at the guilt/innocence stage that appellant had previously been tried for the same offense. We quote from portions of the cross-examination of the State’s witness McIntyre:
 Holcomb: How many times would you say that Mr. Gill has talked with you since this occurrence in 1977?
 McIntyre: Since the last trial, quite a few, but before that —
 MR. HOLCOMB: Your Honor, we would respectfully at this time move for a mistrial in this matter.
 THE COURT: It is denied.
 MR. HOLCOMB: Note our objection.
 Holcomb: Ma’am?
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 McIntyre: But before the other trial, I never talked —
 MR. HOLCOMB: We renew our objection and request for a mistrial, Your Honor.
 THE COURT: It is denied, Mr. Holcomb.
 MR. HOLCOMB: Thank you.
 As shown by the foregoing testimony, the jury was not advised as to what punishment, if any, was assessed against appellant in the former trial nor was the jury informed whether the trial resulted in a conviction or mistrial or that the same was reversed on appeal. Such testimony also reveals that while appellant moved for a mistrial, he did not request the court to instruct the jury to disregard the improper, albeit inadvertent, revelation by the witness McIntyre of the fact that appellant had been previously tried for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, in the name of due process, prohibits a trial judge from imposing a harsher punishment against a defendant upon retrial than that imposed in the first trial where the record does not explain the reasons (“objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding”) for the increased punishment. Such holding is firmly rooted in the premise as stated by the court:
 Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against the defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
 The question as to whether due process requires extension of the rule of North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, to jury resentencing was addressed in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S. Ct. 1977, 36 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1973). The United States Supreme Court there reaffirmed the reasoning in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969),
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holding “… that vindictiveness against the accused for having successfully overturned his conviction has no place in the resentencing process, whether by judge or jury… due process of law does not require extension of Pearce -type restriction to jury [re-]sentencing.” The court in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, went on to state that the record in that case showed that the jury was not aware of the punishment assessed the defendant in his former trial and that they had not been told that the defendant had been convicted in the former trial and that the conviction had been overturned on a collateral attack. The court then addressed defendant’s contentions that: (1) “the higher punishment assessed at re-trial (life instead of fifteen years) violated double jeopardy provisions of the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution through the due process clause of the 14th Amendment”; (2) “higher sentence occasioned by vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority violates traditional concepts of fairness in the criminal process”; and (3) “the possibility of a higher sentence, even absent a reasonable fear of vindictiveness, has an impermissible ‘chilling effect’ on the exercise of the right to appeal and to attack collaterally a conviction.” After carefully reviewing several precedents the court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated by the jury’s assessing a higher punishment upon re-trial and that the Due Process Clause is not offended by such jury action “… so long as the jury is not informed of the prior sentence and the second sentence is not otherwise shown to be a product of vindictiveness.” See also, Weeks v. State, 521 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Cr. App. 1975). The record demonstrates that this case is controlled by such authorities just cited and appellant’s second ground of error is overruled.
 Finding no error judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
 *fn1 Hereafter Penal Code.
19830428 1998 VersusLaw Inc.
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